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INTRODUCTION

Would you rather have a free month of Netflix, or a check for around
$2,000,000?1 How about a small donation to a charity in your name
* Third-year law student, University of Florida Levin College of Law. I would
like to thank U.S. District Court Judge Mark Walker, his clerks, Andrew Grogan and
Dayron Silverio, and my fellow externs, Allie Akre, Stephanie Schwartz, and Laz
Fields, for their insightful thoughts and commentary on this note topic, and without
which this Note would not exist. I will also thank the FloridaLaw Review and all of its
members, especially my note advisors, Miranda Moore, Brad Tennant, and Rachel
Wasserman, for enabling me to write this and providing necessary criticism and support.
Finally, thank you to the University of Florida Journal of Law and Public Policy,
especially Tori Jobe and Bianca Manos, for publishing this Note in their respected
journal and making it readable. Of course, all errors are my own (unless they're not).
1. See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc., 162 Cal. App. 4th 43 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
281
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versus $3,000,000?2 All right, $50 worth of canned tuna or $4,000,000? 3

Each one of these choices represents the difference between an award
given to a plaintiff and the award of attorney's fees given to attorneys
after a class action lawsuit settlement. 4 Class actions are one example of
when attorney's fees can go too far, to the point of interfering with
carrying out the justice that a plaintiff deserves. Yes, lawyers have to get
paid, but there are some areas of law that should not fall prey to the
possibility of attorney's fees-driven bias.
But should this bias even occur? Are class action settlements simply
an anomaly in the otherwise fee bias-absent legal system? An award of
attorney's fees for winning a case has been a serious motive and
consideration for lawyers for a long time.5 If it were a problem, would it
not have been stopped? Unfortunately, the answer to all of these questions
is no. The bias exists in other forms of litigation. In fact, it is not
uncommon for cases to be litigated based solely on attorney's fees. 6 For
many litigating lawyers, attorney's fees are incredibly important to them
and their practice.
On a seemingly unrelated note, a case's removal to federal court
strikes a chord with many lawyers as well; in the classic small-guy versus
mega-corporation lawsuit, posturing to be in state or federal court is
oftentimes the first major battle in a long war. 7 Choice of forum is
extremely important to a plaintiff bringing a lawsuit, and it is thought of
and protected as such by scholars and judges alike. 8 State courts are
thought to be more plaintiff-friendly, as state judges are elected by the
people, the same people who are typically plaintiffs. Moreover, local
juries tend to be more sympathetic toward their peers in their
communities. However, while courts are seen as more defendantfriendly. 9 This mentality arises because federal law places limits on
2. See Daniel Fisher, Appeals Court OKs Facebook Settlement that Pays Lawyers and
'Bespoke' Charity, FORBES (Feb. 27, 2013, 8:35 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/

2013/02/27/appeals-court-oks-facebook-settlement-that-pays-lawyers-and-bespoke-charity/.
3. See Hendricks v. StarKist Co., 30 F. Supp. 3d 917, 922 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
4. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
5. Attorney's fees and costs have been awarded as far back as the American Revolution,
originating in English law. William B. Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A Logical
Development, 38 U. COLO. L. REv. 202, 207 (1968).
6. See Dan B. Dobbs, Awarding Attorney Fees Against Adversaries: Introducing the
Problem, 1986 DUKE L.J. 435, 436 n.10.
7. See, e.g., Lisa Shuchman, Patent 'Troll' Loses Battle to Move Vermont Lawsuit to
FederalCourt,CORPORATE COUNSEL (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202738
6235 09/Patent-Troll-Loses-Battle-to-Move-Vermont-Lawsuit-to-Federal-Court?slretum=20 160
227191841.
8. See 15 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ETAL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3848 (4th
ed. 2015).
9. See, e.g., Maxwell S. Kennerly, Why Civil Defendants Want to Be in Federal Court:
Judicial Vacancies, LITIGATION & TRIAL L. BLOG (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.litigationandtrial.

THESE AREN'T THE FEES YOU'RE LOOKING FOR: WHYATTORNEY'S FEES

discovery1 ° and federal judges are thought to be more prone to grant
motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment. 1 The absence of
these traits in state law makes state courts decidedly less attractive to
in jurisdictional
defendants. This perceived partiality is
2 exacerbated
Note.'
this
in
case
the
is
as
proceedings,
This Note reveals an intersection between attorney's fees and removal
to federal court that has spawned a federal circuit split. 13 Surprisingly,
this split has not yet been resolved. 14 More specifically, the split concerns
how attorney's fees are calculated into the "amount in controversy" when
removing to federal court via diversity jurisdiction.'" There are two
methods of calculation, and courts are conflicted on which is the best to
use. 16 One method, primarily endorsed by the Tenth Circuit, 17 is that the
amount of attorney's fees to be considered is the total potential fees
throughout trial. 18 These fees are also referred to as "future" fees. 19 That
is, an attorney removing to federal court can include all attorney's fees
that he expects the other party to incur assuming that the case goes to and
completes trial. The other method, created and supported by the Seventh
Circuit,2 ° is that the amount of attorney's fees to be considered should
only be those fees that have already been incurred up to the time of
removal. 2 1 That is, a removing attorney can only include the fees that the
other party has already incurred.22 These are also referred to as "past"
com/2013/0 1/articles/series/special-commentljudicial-vacancies/.
10. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26, (b), 33(a)(2).
11. See, e.g., Kennerly, supra note 9.
12. S~e Justin R. Pidot, The Invisibility of JurisdictionalProcedurc and Its Consequences,
64 FLA. L. REv. 1405, 1407-11 (2012).
13. See WRiGHTETAL., supra note 8, § 3725.

14.

Either Congress must pass legislation, or the Supreme Court must rule on the split for

it to be resolved. A Supreme Court decision is probably more likely, since resolving circuit splits

is one of its primary functions according to Chief Justice John Roberts. See Evan Bernick, The
CircuitSplits Are Out There-And the Court Should Resolve Them, FEDERALIST SOCIETY (Aug.
13, 2015), https://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detaiL/the-circuit-splits-are-out-thereand-the-cou

rt-should-resolve-them.
15. To remove on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, a required element is for the "amount
in controversy" to exceed $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2015). Attorney's fees can be properly

calculated into the amount in controversy in two distinct circumstances that are explained later in
this Note. See infra text accompanying notes 43-45.
16. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, § 3725.
17. See Miera v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 143 F.3d 1337, 1340 (10th Cir. 1998).
18. See id The Tenth Circuit's view will be referred to as the "potential fees method" for
the remainder of this Note.
19. See, e.g., Raymond v. Lane Const. Corp., 527 F. Supp. 2d 156, 158 (D. Me. 2007).
20. See Gardynski-Leschuck v. Ford Motor Co., 142 F.3d 955, 958-59 (7th Cir. 1998);
Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 512 (7th Cir. 2006).

21.

This side will be referred to as "time-of-removal fees" for the remainder of this Note.

22.

These fees are typically comprised of those "introductory" fees that a plaintiffs

attorney charges, for. For example: complaint drafting and early discovery. Thus, the fees are
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23

Therefore, the total of attorney's fees calculated pursuant to each
method are often much different than one another. 24 Because of this, a
grant or denial of a party's motion for removal can hinge completely on
the method that a court chooses to employ. 25 In the same way, a motion
for remand is equally as affected.26 This reveals the serious practical
implications of a circuit split in this area: Because federal courts are
applying different laws-depending on what circuit the court is in27_
cases are being removed with varying standards and thus much more
easily in some jurisdictions. 28 This could have serious, adverse
repercussions, such as creating a "judicial Tower of Babel"' 29 engendering confusion amongst litigants-and encouraging forum
shopping.3 °
In Part I, this Note will begin with a brief history and explanation on
how and when attorney's fees are calculated into the amount in
controversy. Part II will explain the state of the law in each federal circuit,
highlighting which circuits are the primary "actors" in the circuit split.
Part III will consist of a discussion of the arguments for and against each
side of the circuit split. Part IV will explore how the Supreme Court
should rule when inevitably faced with the decision, and definitively
conclude which side is best. Finally, this Note will conclude with some
thoughts on the wisdom of allowing attorney's fees into the amount in
controversy.
often not very substantial.
23.

27B JOHNBORDEAUETAL., C.J.S. DIVORCE § 545 (2016).

24. This is to be expected, because usually a case that is being removed has barely, if at all,
started discovery. This is especially true since § 1446 sets a 30-day time limit on removal after
the initial pleading is filed. 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (2015). Because the potential fees method calculates
all estimated future attorney's fees, the number is almost always substantially greater.
25. See, e.g., Raymond v. Lane Const. Corp., 527 F. Supp. 2d 156, 161 (D. Me. 2007).
26. See, e.g., Mirras v. Time Ins. Co., 578 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1352-53 (M.D. Fla. 2008).
27. Which is purely a geographic distinction, as the federal circuits are just organized on a
regional

basis. How the Federal Courts Are Organized, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,

http://www.fj c.gov/federallcourts.nsf/autoframe?OpenForm&nav=menu3 a&page=/federal/court
s.nsf/page/181 ?opendocument (last visited Oct. 20, 2015).
28. See, e.g., Miera v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 143 F.3d 1337, 1340 (10th Cir. 1998). In Miera,

the plaintiff had incurred -$6,900 in attorney's fees by the time of removal. Added to the damages
estimate of -$4 1,000, this made the amount in controversy to be -$47,900 before future fees were
added. The Court decided to add on potential attorney's fees, which increased the amount in

controversy to over the jurisdictional minimum, therefore preventing removal. Id. at 1339-40. If
this same action was in a jurisdiction favoring the time-of-removal method, then the amount in
controversy would not have been met, and federal jurisdiction would not have been proper.
29. Daniel J. Meador, A Challenge to the JudicialArchitecture: Modifying the Regional
Design of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 56 U. Cm.L. REV. 603, 640 (1989).
30. See Matthew Lund, Rockwell International,Pondcrete,andan A La Carte Three-Step
Test for Determiningan "OriginalSource" in Qui Tam Lawsuits, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1243, 1244-

45,48-49 (2008).
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I. WHAT IS THE AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY, AND WHEN ARE
ATTORNEY'S FEES CALCULATED INTO IT?

One of two ways that cases get into federal court is through diversity
jurisdiction guaranteed by 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 3 1 Section 1332 grants
federal courts original subject matter jurisdiction over a case provided
that: (1) the parties involved in the lawsuit are completely diverse 32 and
(2) the "amount in controversy" being litigated is above $75,000. 33 Often,
there is not much wiggle room in whether or not the first element is meteither you are diverse or not.34 So, the amount in controversy is very
frequently where lawsuits depend on being removed or not. That makes
what gets calculated into the amount incredibly important. According to
Wright & Miller, the amount in controversy is measured by the
"pecuniary value of the right that the plaintiff seeks to enforce or protect
or the value of the object that is the subject matter of the suit. 35", Clearly,
what is determined the "object" of the suit or the economic value of the
right that the plaintiff is litigating for depends on the circumstances of
each specific suit. 36 However, overall what is measured into the amount
in controversy is the value of whatever matter brought the plaintiff to
court. Now, how do attorney's fees fit into this measurement?
In American law, each party is typically responsible for paying its own
attorney's fees throughout litigation and is not entitled to receive an
award in attorney's fees for winning. 37 Known, not coincidentally, as the
"American Rule," 38 the idea is that by requiring each party to pay its own
way and not be subject to paying the other side's fees should they lose,
the American Rule works to encourage plaintiffs to seek redress, rather
than be afraid of the consequences. 39 Because the fees are not normally
recoverable, it follows that attorney's fees cannot typically be calculated
31. The other way being federal question jurisdiction, outlined by 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2015).
32. It is not imperative to this Note to go in-depth about what the diversity requiromont
entails. Complete diversity simply means that the litigating parties on each side of the "v." are
citizens of different states or countries. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2015).
33. See id.
34. This is a small over-simplification, since clearly there are some circumstances where a
party's citizenship is open to interpretation. However, in comparison to the amount in controversy,
there is not as much dispute here.
35. See WRIGHTETAL.,supra note 8, § 3702.5.
36. For example, the value of a breach of contract claim would be the damages incurred by
the plaintiff, or those allowed by contract. For a car accident personal injury claim, it would
include the value of the injury to the plaintiff, plus lost wages, and hospital bills.
37. See John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured
Person's Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1567, 1569 (1993).
38. See id.
39. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The English Versus the American Rule
on Attorney Fees: An EmpiricalStudy of Public Company Contracts, 98 CORNELL L. REv. 327,
333-34 (2013).
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into the amount in controversy, and they typically are not.40 However,
reasonable attorney's fees are properly calculated into the amount in
controversy when certain exceptions to the general rule are met. 41 These
exceptions exist in circumstances where awarding attorney's fees will
further an important policy interest. 42 For the purposes of this Note, there
are two main circumstances when attorney's fees can properly be
calculated into the amount in controversy: (1) when attorney's fees are
allowed by state statutes 43 as a reward of damages, and (2) when
attorney's fees are provided for as damages by contract.44 These
45
exceptions are uniform throughout the federal circuits.
Regarding the first circumstance, there are a plethora of state statutes
and causes of action that necessitate an award of attorney's fees.46 The
statutes that provide for attorney's fees typically do so as a kind of
punitive measure. 47 These statutes range from typical breach of contract
claims 48 to prohibitions on persons releasing health records without
authorization. 49 Because there are so many different statutes that cover
varying causes of action, many parties have the opportunity to include
attorney's fees into the amount in controversy in this way. Concerning
the second circumstance, it is as simple as it sounds: If a contract includes
a clause that states that suing under the contract will award attorney's
fees, then fees are allowed to be included.50 Consequently, many
40. See Spielman v. Genzyme Corp., 251 F.3d 1, 6-7 (ist Cir. 2001); see WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 8, § 3725.
41. See WRIGHTET AL., supra note 8, at 837, § 3712.

42. Usually, attorney's fees are awarded when it is equitable to do so, such as when a
contract allows attorney's fees to be awarded or when a contract is breached. See Theodore E.
Karatinos & Hugh C. Umsted, Beyond Statute, Rule, and Contract: Equity as a Basis for
Awarding Attorneys' Fees, 80 FLA. BAR J. 41, 41 (2006), http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/
JN/JNJournal01 .nsf/SMTGT/Beyond%20Statute,%20Rule,%20and%20Contract%3A%20Equit
y/o20as%20a%20Basis%20for/o20Awarding%20Attorneys'%20Fees.

43. One may also think to include federal statutes that allow for an award of attorney's
fees, such as the American with Disabilities Act (ADA) or the Fair Housing Act (FHA). 42 U.S.C.
§ 12205 (2015); id. § 3613(c); see also Jonathan J. Sheffield, At Forty-Five Years Old the
Obligation to Affirmatively Further Fair Housing Gets a Face-Life, But Will It Integrate
America's Cities?, 25 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, 51, 103 n. 308 (2014) (explaining that the FHJA

allows for attorney's fees to be granted as relief).
44. See WRIGHTET AL., supra note 8, at 842, § 3725.
45. See id.
46. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 627.428 (2015); MINN. STAT. § 144.298, Subd. 2 (2015); ME.
STAT. tit. 5 § 4614 (2015); N.Y. GENERAL BUSINESS LAW § 349 (McKinney 2015); 73 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 201-9.2 (2016); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-106 (2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-25.22 (2015);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-22-308 (West 2015).
47. Think of it as: "How dare you violate this, and bring this poor plaintiff into court? You
should be punished!"
48. FLA. STAT. § 627.428 (2015).
49. MINN. STAT. § 144.298, Subd. 2 (2015).
50. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra 8, § 3725.
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contracts often have a fee-shifting clause in them, which widens the field
for how often attorney's fees are included into the amount in controversy.
These two ways to include attorney's fees into the amount in
controversy are well settled by now. The rules have largely stemmed from
Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Jones,5 1 a Supreme Court decision from
1933, and have formed into what they are now by the circuit and district
courts. In MissouriLife, the Court decided that a "reasonable attorney's
fee" is properly allowed to be calculated into the amount in controversy,
instead of being withheld from the calculation as a cost. 52 Missouri Life

and its implications to the current circuit split will be explained later in
this Note.53
II. THE STATE

OF TWE LAW IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUITS

Now that the legal background has been explained, it is necessary to
show which circuits favor each method of calculation, and why they do
so. 54 Further, there is currently a lack of a comprehensive analysis of all
the circuit's positions and their reasons for having them. 55 This Note
hopes to fill that void in legal scholarship. Regarding the split, the circuits
have certainly displayed a lack of clarity--only about 45% of the circuits
have recognized using one method over the other. 56 There are still 6
circuits-a majority-that have not yet ruled on the issue.57 Of the 5
circuits that have made a ruling, the potential-fees method has the weight
of authority with 4 circuits recognizing it. 58 This may not seem like
resounding support on its own, but when compared with the time-ofremoval method-which is only recognized by a single circuit-it holds
more weight.5 9 Of the circuits that have not ruled on the issue, a few have
recognized that there is a split, but have chosen not to pick a side. 60 Others
have simply used both methods in their district courts without resolving
the split. 1 Here is a run-through of where each circuit stands and its
51.
52.
53.

Mo. State Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 290 U.S. 199 (1933).
Id. at 201-02.
See infra Part IV.

54. This is important because when the Supreme Court considers the split, the Court will
examine the same. This Note strives to be as accurate and exhaustive as a Supreme Court review.
55. The closest legal scholarship is included in Wright & Miller's Federal Practice and
Procedure. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, § 3725.
56. Five of the eleven circuits have ruled on which side of the split they are on. See id.

57.

The First, Second, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have not yet definitively

ruled on which side of the split they fall. See id.
58. SeeinfraPartfl.B.
59. See infra Part II.A.
60. See, e.g., Charvat v. NMP LLC, 656 F.3d 440, 454-55 (6th Cir. 2011).
61. The Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits are internally split on which method to use.
See infra Part II.C; infra text accompanying notes 96-119 and accompanying text.
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opinion on the matter.
A. CircuitsFavoringthe Time-of-Removal Method
The Seventh Circuit is the only circuit that supports the time-ofremoval method-it created the circuit split. 62 The Seventh Circuit first
introduced the time-of-removal method in Gardynski-Leschuck v. Ford
Motor Co. in 1998.63 Since Gardynski-Leschuck--even after multiple
circuits have come out to support the potential-fees side 64-the Seventh
Circuit has continued to use the time-of-removal method, and it
reaffirmed its holding in 2006.65 The Circuit's district courts have
followed its ruling throughout this time.66 The Seventh Circuit's
reasoning for not following the majority convention primarily relies on
an original idea that attorney's fees are different from other types of
67
future damages because they are technically avoidable by the defendant.
This Note will go more in depth with the Seventh Circuit's reasoning
later, in Part III. 8
B. Circuits Favoringthe PotentialMethod
Like the Seventh Circuit and the time-of-removal method, the Tenth
Circuit is the leader on the potential fees method. The Tenth Circuit ruled
in favor of the potential fees method in 1998,69 and is seen by many
district courts and other circuit courts as the headliner for the method.7°
In fact, the Tenth Circuit was the first circuit to rule definitively in favor
of the potential fees method.7 ' Strangely, the Tenth Circuit's approach to
the potential fees method is without much analysis or policy-driven
waxing. 72 The leading case in the Tenth Circuit, and of the potential fees
62. See Gardynski-Leschuck v. Ford Motor Co., 142 F.3d 955, 958-59 (7th Cir. 1998);
Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 512 (7th Cir. 2006).
63. See Gardynski-Leschuck, 142 F.3d at 958-59.
64. The Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits support the potential-fees calculation. See
infra Part lI.B.
65. See Oshana,472 F.3d at 512.
66. See Atteberry v. Esurance Ins. Servs., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 2d 876, 877 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
67. See Gardynski-Leschuck, 142 F.3d at 958-59.
68. See infra Part fII.A and accompanying footnotes.
69. See Miera v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 143 F.3d 1337, 1340 (10th Cir. 1998).
70. See Suber v. Chrysler Corp., 104 F.3d 578, 585 (3d Cir. 1997); Raymond v. Lane
Constr. Corp., 527 F. Supp. 2d 156, 162-63 (D. Me. 2007); Charvat v. NMP LLC, 656 F.3d 440,
454-55 (6th Cir. 2011); Reames v. AB Car Servs., Inc., 899 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1020 (D. Or. 2012).
71. SeeMiera, 143 F.3dat 1340.
72. The decision to use potential fees is only represented by a few sentences citing to
Missouri Life. See id. This is very contrary to the approach taken by the Seventh Circuit, which
provided a well thought out analysis of the issue. See Gardynski-Leschuck v. Ford Motor Co.,
142 F.3d 955, 958-59 (7th Cir. 1998).

THESE AREN'T THE FEES YOU'RE LOOKING FOR: WHYA TTORNEY'S FEES

method in general, is Miera v. DairylandIns. Co. 73 Miera basically takes
"reasonable attorney's fee" to mean potential, future fees, and does so by
simply stating that the Supreme Court has "long held" that potential fees
74 More on Miera's
may be used in calculating the amount in controversy.
7
reasoning will be discussed later, in Part 111. 1
The Third Circuit has recognized that potential fees are to be
considered when calculating the amount in controversy, 76 and its district
courts have followed its ruling.77 There does not seem to be any district
courts that have elected to choose to follow the time-of-removal method
instead. The Third Circuit's rationale is not very unique-the circuit takes
a "follow the leader" approach behind the Tenth Circuit.78 The leading
case in the Third Circuit, Suber v. Chrysler Corp., demonstrates this well.
It does not have much of a rationalization of why it is allowing potential
fees only that it is following Missouri Life.79
The Fourth Circuit is more interesting. As late as 1983, the Fourth
Circuit did not consider potential attorney's fees into the amount in
controversy calculation. 80 That has recently changed: Now, the Fourth
Circuit has recognized that potential fees are to be considered into the
amount in controversy as recently as 2013,81 and its district courts have
adhered to the Fourth Circuit's ruling. 82 In Francisv. Allstate Ins. Co.,
the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that potential attorney's fees are
properly considered into the amount in controversy by agreeing with a
Maryland district court that stated the reasoning.83 The Maryland district
court ruled for potential fees citing Missouri Life-but not giving much
explanation-and a Ninth Circuit case 84 that was closely analogous to the
case at bar. 85 Thus, similar to the Third Circuit, the Fourth Circuit seems
to have taken a "follow the leader" approach behind the Tenth Circuit
73.
74.
75.
76.

Miera, 143 F.3d 1337.
at 1340.
See id.
See infra Part III and accompanying footnotes.
See Suber v. Chrysler Corp., 104 F.3d 578, 585 (3d Cir. 1997).

77.

See Faltaous v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 07-1572 (JLL), 2007 WL 3256833, at *10-

12 (D.N.J. 2007); DeAngelo Bros., Inc. v. Long, No. 4:05-CV-0800, 2005 WL 1309037, at *4
(M.D. Pa. 2005); Abood v. Gulf Grp. Lloyds, No. 3:2007-299, 2008 WL 2641310, at *2-3 (W.D.
Pa. 2008).
78. See Suber, 104 F.3 dat 585.
79. See id.
80. See Saval v. BL, Ltd., 710 F.2d 1027, 1032-33 (4th Cir. 1983).
81. See Francis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 709 F.3d 362, 368-69 (4th Cir. 2013).
82. See Rojas-Roberts v. Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC, No. WMN- 15-01074, 2015 WL
5047494, at *3 (D. Md. 2015); Mary L. Martin, Ltd. v. State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 1301089, 2013 WL 2181206, at *4 (D. Md. 2013).
83. See Francis,709 F.3d at 368-9 (citing Gilman v. Wheat, First Sec., Inc., 896 F. Supp.
507, 511 (D. Md. 1995)).
84. Goldberg v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 678 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1982).
85. See Gilman, 896 F. Supp. at 510.
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without explicitly stating so.
The Fifth Circuit has ruled that potential fees are to be calculated into
the amount in controversy.8 6 The district courts within the circuit have
adhered to this ruling. 87 In Grantv. Chevron Phillips Chemical Co., the
Fifth Circuit explicitly states that potential fees are to be calculated into
the amount of controversy. 8 8 The Circuit relies on one of its earlier
decisions to do this,8 9 but the decision did not explicitly mention potential
fees. 90 The Fifth Circuit thus implied the meaning, the case being about
91
four years after the Tenth Circuit's ruling in Miera.
C. Circuits That Remain Undecided
The First Circuit has not made a definitive decision on which side of
the split it prefers. 92 However, its district courts have consistently applied
the potential fees method, and in relatively high volume. 93 Because of the
amount of cases employing the potential fees method and the lack of a
district court taking the other side, this could explain why the First Circuit
94
has not explicitly ruled on the issue-it does not have to.
The leading district court case in the First Circuit, Raymond v. Lane
Const. Corp., argues that potential fees should be considered because
courts routinely consider future damages in the amount in controversy,
and that treating attorney's fees differently is not supported by the statute
in question. 95 The court in Raymond does not see a good reason for
treating attorney's fees differently than any other form of future relief,
and dismisses the problem of inflated fees by stating that the fees "should
bear special scrutiny" under the current standards of proof.96 The court in
Raymond is a refreshing change in its analysis. All of the circuit courts
that have endorsed the potential fees method do so without much

86. See Grant v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., 309 F.3d 864, 876 (5th Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 538 U.S. 945 (2003).
87. See Gordon v. Air Liquide-Big Three, Inc., No. 12-396-SDD-RLB, 2013 WL
3490725, at *454 (M.D. La. 2013); Evans v. Int'l Paper Co., No. 11-0214, 2011 WL 2559791, at
*3-4 (W.D. La. 2011).
88. See Grant, 309 F.2d at 873.
89. See id.
90. See In re Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d 524, 526 (5th Cir. 1995).
91. The Tenth Circuit made its decision to use the potential fees method in 1998, and the
Fifth Circuit's decision here was made in 2002. Miera, 143 F.3d at 1340; Grant, 309 F.3d at 876.
92. See Raymond v. Lane Constr. Corp., 527 F. Supp. 2d 156, 161 (D. Me. 2007).
93. See id. at 162 (collecting cases); Youtsey v. Avibank Mfg., Inc., 734 F. Supp. 2d 230,
238-39 (D. Mass. 2010).

94. Meaning that because its district courts are consistently applying one method, it is not
necessary for the First Circuit to address the matter; everything is working fine inside the circuit.
95.

See Raymond Constr., 527 F. Supp. 2d at 163.

96. Id.
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97

explanation.
The Second Circuit has not made a ruling on either side of the split,
and there are no clear cases that directly address the split.98 Unlike the
First Circuit, the Second Circuit's district courts do not have a method
that they have seemed to support consistently. The Second Circuit and its
district courts acknowledge that a reasonable attorney's fee can be
calculated into the amount in controversy. 99 Many of the cases that
consider calculating attorney's fees into the amount in controversy do not
explicitly state that potential100fees should be considered, but a few cases
seem to imply that they do.
The Sixth Circuit has not yet had a definitive ruling on either side of
the split. 10 1 Interestingly, however, the Circuit has acknowledged that the
split exists. 10 2 In Charvatv. NMP LLC, instead of deciding the issue, the
Circuit refrained, explaining that it was not necessary to decide how
attorney's fees should be calculated in the matter at issue in the case. 103
10 4
This was in 2011, and the Sixth Circuit has not yet revisited the issue.
The Circuit's district courts have mentioned the split, but not in a
definitive fashion.105 There is virtually no telling what the Sixth Circuit
will do when again faced with the issue.
The Eighth Circuit has also not yet ruled on either side of the split. 106
However, there is a split in the Eighth Circuit's district courts, with one
opinion taking the time-of-removal fees method, 10 7 and a more recent
opinion supporting the potential fees method. 10 8 In Great America
Leasing Corp. v. Rohr-Tippe Motors, Inc., the time-of-removal case, the
97.
98.

See supra Part II.B. & accompanying footnotes.
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, § 3725.

99.

See, e.g., Givens v. W.T. Grant Co., 457 F.2d 612,614 (2d Cir. 1972); Ins. Co. of State

of Pa. v. Waterfield, 371 F. Supp. 2d 146, 149 (D. Conn. 2005).
100. See Waterfield, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 149; Sheldon v. Khanal, 2011 WL 3876970, at *79 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2011). Reading the cases, it is almost as if the understanding is that potential

fees apply, so that it does not need to be explicitly stated. Regardless, the fact remains that it is
not explicitly stated.
101.
102.
103.
104.

See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, § 3725.
See Charvat v. NMP LLC, 656 F.3d 440, 444-55 (6th Cir. 2011).
See id. at 455.
Id.

105.

One Ohio district court has failed to pick sides, as it was not necessary, while another

has impliedly applied the potential fees side in an amount in controversy calculation. See
Heartland-Mt. Airy of Cincinnati Ohio LLC v. Johnson, 2015 WL 667682, at *5 (S.D. Ohio W.
Div. 2015); Reusser v. Saxon Mortg. Servs., Inc., 2012 WL 3241973, at *5 (S.D. Ohio E. Div.
2012).
106. See Feller v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 817 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1104-08 (S.D.
Iowa 2010).
107. See Great America Leasing Corp. v. Rohr-Tippe Motors, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 2d 992,
996-97 (N.D. Iowa 2005).
108. See Feller, 817 F. Supp. 2d at 1104-08.
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court reasons that because of the rule that jurisdiction should be
determined by looking at the case as it was at the time filed, 109 it follows
that potential fees do not belong in the amount in controversy
calculation. 1 0 The court also finds the Seventh Circuit's "avoidable"
distinction compelling."' For the potential fees method, Feller v.
HartfordLife & Acc. Ins. Co. comes to the opposite conclusion because
it finds the Tenth Circuit's reasoning to be more applicable than the
Seventh's. 112 The court in Feller is similar to previous courts discussed
that take a "follow the leader" approach behind the Tenth Circuit." 3 This
intra-circuit split will likely hasten the Eighth Circuit to choose a side if
it continues to produce different outcomes within the circuit.
The Ninth Circuit has not ruled on either side of the split, and has been
silent regarding the matter.114 However, similar to the Eighth Circuit, its
district courts have considered the issue and are split on which method to
use.115 At least two district courts in the Ninth Circuit support the
potential fees method,1 16 and an equal number support the time-ofremoval method. 1 7 On the potential fees side, the district court reasons
in Brady v. Mercedes-Benz USA, Inc. that the Tenth Circuit's approach is
more compelling, because the "realit[ies] of litigation" call for a plaintiff
to absorb a substantial cost in attorney's fees, and these are rightfully
included in the amount in controversy." 8 Contrarily, the district court in
Reames v. AB Car Rental Services, Inc. finds the Seventh Circuit's
argument more appealing, and dismisses potential fees as decidedly too
19
speculative to be of any worth to the amount in controversy calculation. 1120
This matter seems to be coming up very frequently in the Ninth Circuit,
which should prompt the court to resolve the intra-circuit split soon.
109. This rule has been adopted by the Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit alike. See Wis.
Dep't of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 390 (1998); Colorado Life Co. v. Steele, 95 F.2d 535,
537 (8th Cir. 1938).
110. See Great America Leasing Corp., 38 F. Supp. 2d at 996-97.
111. See id.
112. See Feller v. Hartford Life & Accident. Ins. Co., 817 F. Supp. 2d 1097, at 1104-08
(S.D. Iowa 2010).
113. See supra Part II.B and accompanying footnotes.
114.

See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, § 3725.

115. See Brady v. Mercedes-Benz USA, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1010-11 (N.D. Cal.
2002) (supporting the potential-fees method); Reames v. AB Car Rental Servs., Inc., 899 F. Supp.
2d 1012, 1019-21 (D. Or. 2012) (supporting the time-of-removal method).
116. See Brady, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 1010-11; Cain v. Hartford Life & Accident. Ins. Co.,
890 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1250-51 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
117. See Reames, 899 F. Supp. 2d at 1019-21; Byroth v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 2015 WL
5022899, at *4-6 (D. Mont. Aug. 21, 2015).
118. SeeBrady,243 F. Supp.2dat 1010-11.
119. See Reames, 899 F. Supp. 2d at 1020-21.
120. The court in Reames mentions whole lines of cases within the Ninth Circuit that take
each side of the split. See id. at 1019-1021.
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The Eleventh Circuit has not ruled on the split. 121 Like the Eighth and

Ninth Circuits previously, its district courts are also split as to which
method to use.122 There is even a district court that has split itself by
ruling on both sides of the split. 123 In Waltemyer v. Northwestern Mut.
Life Ins. Co., representing the time-of-removal method, the district court
reasons that the rule that the amount in controversy is determined by the
circumstances at the time of removal controls the attorney's fees
question-much like the Seventh Circuit doesl'g--and thus potential fees
should not be considered.125 Contrarily, a district court in Mirras v. Time
Ins. Co. applied the potential fees method, without discussing the split or
explicitly stating that potential fees are being considered. 126 In its
reasoning-of which there is very127little-the Mirras court simply takes
"reasonable" to mean "potential.,

D. Impression
In sum, the Tenth, 128 Third, 129 Fourth,13 ° and Fifth 131 Circuits agree

that potential attorney's fees should be calculated into the amount in
controversy. The Seventh Circuit stands alone in saying that only those
fees that have incurred up to the time of removal should be calculated
into the amount. 132 The First, Second, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh
133 although a few circuits'
Circuits have not made a determination,
134
district courts have made up their minds.
After comprehensively going through the circuits and witnessing the
general circuit split and intra-circuit splits, is there no better illustration
121. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8,§ 3725.
122. See Tober v. Transamerica Life Ins. Co., 2012 WL 2413766, at *3 (S.D. Fla. 2012);
Mirras v. Time Ins. Co., 578 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1352-53 (M.D. Fla. 2008) (supporting potential
fees method).
123. See Waltemyer v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 2007 WL 419663, at *2 (M.D. Fla.
2007) (supporting time-of-removal method); Mirras v. Time Ins. Co., 578 F. Supp. 2d 1351,
1352-53 (M.D. Fla. 2008) (supporting potential fees method).
124. See Gardynski-Leschuck v. Ford Motor Co., 142 F.3d 955, 958-59 (7th Cir. 1998).
125. See Waltemyer, 2007 WL 419663, at *2.
126. See Mirras, 578 F. Supp. 2d at 1352-53.
127. See id.
128. See Miera v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 143 F.3d 1337, 1340 (10th Cir. 1998).
129. See Suber v. Chrysler Corp., 104 F.3d 578, 585 (3d Cir. 1997).
130. See Francis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 709 F.3d 362, 368-69 (4th Cir. 2013).
131. See Grant v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., 309 F.3d 864, 876 (5th Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 538 U.S. 945 (2003).
132. See Gardynski-Leschuck v. Ford Motor Co., 142 F.3d 955, 958-59 (7th Cir. 1998).
133. See WRIGHTET AL., supra note 8, § 3725.
134. The First Circuit's district courts are uniformly in the potential fees side. See supra Part
ll.C; supra text accompanying note 95. The Second Circuit's district courts seem to imply support
for the potential fees side as well. See supra Part H.C, supra text accompanying note 102.
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of how big of a problem this matter is? Even in the same district court,
plaintiffs are getting completely opposite rulings! 135 In the circuits with
divides in which method is being applied, chances are that the respective
circuit court will step in to handle the dispute. However, this has not
happened as quickly as one would think. This is probably because there
is general reluctance to take the matter on within the circuits that are still
undecided, 136 perhaps because these circuits are waiting for the Supreme
Court to take action. Some circuit courts have stated their awareness of
the split, but it37seems that they do not want to touch the decision with a
ten-foot pole. 1
HI. THE MERITS

& DRAWBACKS OF EACH METHOD

Because this split exists-thereby signifying support for each method
by reasonable, high-level thinkers-it is evident that there are reasonable
arguments for each side. An analysis of the different circuits' rationales
in holding for their side of the split is necessary. Because the arguments
for each side are largely the same across the circuits, in the interest of
brevity this Note will refer to the potential fees method as represented by
the Tenth Circuit, and the time-of-removal method as represented by the
Seventh Circuit. 138 If an interesting insight or commentary to the
arguments exists in one of the other nine circuits, 139 then this Note will
include the insight and identify the respective circuit. After discussing the
rationales and arguments that the circuits posit for each method, this Note
will add additional commentary on the advantages and disadvantages of
each method of calculation while differentiating between the circuits'
arguments, and finally make a recommendation as to which side is the
more compelling.
A. The Time-of-Removal Method
The time-of-removal method is certainly the product of well-thoughtout analysis. The argument that the Seventh Circuit uses is very
interesting. The method championed by the Seventh Circuit is, stated
135. Supra Part II.C and supra text accompanying note 125.
136. See supraPart II.C.
137. The Sixth Circuit is the best example of this, explicitly stating that it will not decide
the matter. Charvat v. NMP LLC, 656 F.3d 440, 444-45 (6th Cir. 2011).
138. The arguments contained within the cases in each circuit, respectively. See Miera v.
Dairyland Ins. Co., 143 F.3d 1337, 1340 (10th Cir. 1998); Gardynski-Leschuck v. Ford Motor
Co., 142 F.3d 955, 958-59 (7th Cir. 1998).
139. Sometimes when discussing the split, the circuits add a small thought or so that is new
to the argument. See, e.g., Raymond v. Lane Constr. Corp., 527 F. Supp. 2d 156, 161 (D. Me.
2007) (possessing a great summation of the split and insightful commentary).
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simply: Only fees incurred up to the time of removal should be calculated
into the amount in controversy.1 4 The Seventh Circuit came to its
conclusion by extrapolating the time-of-removal method from the general
rule that "the amount in controversy is determined at the time of removal,
and subsequent matters that affect the amount will not divest the court of
jurisdiction., 141 Normally, this rule has been used to restrict a removed
plaintiff from changing circumstances to prompt a remand to state court,
such as amending their complaint to claim less damages to fall below the
$75,000 required amount. 2The Seventh Circuit and courts on the timeof-removal side have extended the rule to apply to attorney's fees. They
argue that because the rule states that the amount in controversy is
determined by the circumstances at the time of removal, then only fees
incurred up to that point should be considered,143as potential fees have not
yet happened and are entirely too speculative.
Further, the Seventh Circuit has taken an innovative approach to the
issue, holding that accounting for potential attorney's fees in the amount
in controversy involves a value that may never be incurred, and therefore
does not ever actually exist as "in controversy" between the parties. 144 In
Gardynski-Leschuck, the Seventh Circuit distinguishes attorney's fees
from other future damages that are usually calculated into the amount in
controversy by categorizing attorney's fees as "avoidable" by the
defendant. 145 The Circuit concludes that because a defendant can meet a
plaintiffs demands and end the dispute without paying potential
cannot be truly
attorney's fees, such as when settling out of court, the fees 146
"in controversy" between the parties at the time of filing.
B. The PotentialFees Method
On the potential fees side, the Tenth Circuit argues that the matter was
decided long ago-1933-in Missouri State Life Ins. Co, v. Jones, and
the other circuits follow. 147 In Miera, the Tenth Circuit asserts that "the
Supreme Court has long held that when a statute permits recovery of
140. See Gardynski-Leschuck v. Ford Motor Co., 142 F.3d 955, at 958-59 (7th Cir. 1998);
Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 512 (7th Cir. 2006).
Waltemyer v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 2007 WL 419663, at *2 (M.D. Fla.
141.
2007).
142. See Poore v. Am.-Amicable Life Ins. Co. of Tex., 218 F.3d 1287, 1290 (11th Cir.
2000), overruledon other grounds by Alvarez v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 508 F.3d 639, 640-41 (1 1th
Cir. 2007).
143. See Gardynski-Leschuck, 142 F.3d at 958-59; Waltemyer, 2007 WL 419663, at *2.
144. See Gardynski-Leschuck, 142 F.3d at 958-59.
145. See id.
146. See id
147. Miera v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 143 F.3d 1340 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Mo. State Life Ins.
Co. v. Jones, 290 U.S. 199 at 202 (1933)).
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attorney's fees a reasonable estimate may be used in calculating the
necessary jurisdictional amount in a removal proceeding based upon
diversity of citizenship." 148 In MissouriLife, an insured sued his insurer
and sought an award of attorney's fees pursuant to an Arkansas statute
that allowed the fees to be awarded. 149 The defendant attempted to
remove the action to federal court based on diversity of citizenship,
claiming the attorney's fees should be included into the amount in
controversy. 150 The district court denied the removal, and judgment went
against the defendant in state court. 151 On appeal, the Supreme Court
directly considered whether attorney's fees mandated by statute should
be considered in the amount in controversy, and ruled that they should
be. 152 The Court reasoned that because the Arkansas statute authorized
the attorney's fees to be awarded, it "created a liability enforceable by
proper judgment in a federal court," and thus the liability becomes part
of the amount in controversy. 153 On these facts, the Tenth Circuit
postulated that a "reasonable attorney's fee" as discussed in MissouriLife
essentially is defined as potential attorney's fees. 154 That is extent of the
Tenth Circuit's argument: the Supreme Court decided it, and that's what
we are doing.
Additionally, the District Court of Maine out of the First Circuit in
Raymond v. Lane Construction Corp. brought up an additional argument
for the potential fees method. 5 5 In addition to the Tenth Circuit's
reasoning, the court in Raymond argued that because courts "routinely
consider future damages, such as pain and suffering, medical bills, and
lost wages," that attorney's fees are simply a form of future "damages"
and should not be treated differently. 156 There is also some support for
the potential fees method because when a case is originally filed in federal
court, it is settled that potential fees are calculated into the amount in
controversy. 157 Basically, both of these arguments are asking: why
change things?
C. The More Compelling Method
The stronger and more logical side of the split is the time-of-removal
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id.
Mo. Life, 290 U.S. 199, 201-02.
Id. at 201.
Id.
Id. at200,202.
Id. at202.
See Miera v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 143 F.3d 1340 (10th Cir. 1998).
See Raymond v. Lane Constr. Corp., 527 F. Supp. 2d 156, 161-63 (D. Me. 2007).

156. Id.at 164.
157. See, e.g., Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1035 (1 1th Cir. 2001) (citing Graham v.
Henegar, 640 F.2d 732, 736 (5th Cir. 1981)).
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method-that only those attorney's fees incurred up to the time of
removal are to be calculated into the amount in controversy. 158 It is well
established that on removal, the amount in controversy is determined at
the time of the removal, and that subsequent matters will not change it.' 5 9
the
While this rule was originally intended to clarify that a change in
0
action after removal, such as a plaintiff amending their complaint,16 will
not divest the federal court ofjurisdiction and call for remand, 16 1 it makes
sense to extend the rule to support the notion that potential attorney's fees
fees have not
are not to be calculated into the amount in controversy-the
162
happened yet, and they may never happen.
Further, the Seventh Circuit's specific approach that potential
attorney's fees are avoidable by the defendant and therefore cannot be
considered into the amount in controversy 163 is convincing. Attorney's
fees can certainly be said to be technically avoidable by the defendant,
since at any time the defendant can offer to settle with the plaintiff. In this
way, attorney's fees are not part of the "harm" or "injury," financial or
physical, incurred by the plaintiff. It is true that it is well established that
attorney's fees can be and are awarded, often based on statutory
liability. 164 If a plaintiff is claiming an entitlement to attorney's fees, it is
a liability that the defendant will have to take up if the plaintiff prevails.
While some may characterize this as an unavoidable liability to the
defendant, that is not the distinction that matters. What matters is that the
potential attorney's fees can be avoided, while other types of future
damages-pain and suffering, medical bills, lost wages-cannot be
avoided. It is this distinction that makes them different than the other
future damages.
Another challenge to the time-of-removal method is that potential
attorney's fees are calculated into the amount in controversy when actions
are originally filed in federal court, 165 so why should it be different for
removal? It should be different because when a plaintiff originally files
158. See supra Part III.A.
159. See Poore v. Am.-Amicable Life Ins. Co. of Tex., 218 F.3d 1287, 1289-90 (1lth Cir.
2000), overruledon other grounds by Alvarez v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 508 F.3d 639, 640-41 (11th
Cir. 2007).
160. Plaintiffs do this "trick" many times and it is something that federal courts look out for.
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, § 3702.1.

161. If an amendment such as this were allowed, than many plaintiffs who get pulled into
federal court by the defendant will intentionally decrease their ceiling for recovery just so that
they can be remanded to state court. This would be incredibly unfair to defendants and allow
plaintiffs to unreasonably manipulate the removal system.
162. The defendant may settle, then those speculative potential fees would no longer exist.
163. See Gardynski-Leschuck v. Ford Motor Co., 142 F.3d 955, 955-59 (7th Cir. 1998).
164. See, e.g., Mo. State Life Ins. v. Jones, 290 U.S. 199, 201-02 (1933); WRIGHT ET AL.
supra note 8, § 3725.
165. See, e.g., Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292 (1lth Cir. 2001).
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in federal court, that filing is already taking the plaintiff's choice of forum
into account. 166 As discussed earlier in the Note, it is paramount that a
plaintiffs choice of forum is protected. 167 The plaintiff, by originally
filing in federal court, thereby chooses federal court, so a calculation via
the potential fees method favors the plaintiff. By allowing defendants to
use potential attorney's fees for the jurisdictional amount, removal will
be substantially easier for defendants to achieve. 168 This clearly disrupts
1 69
a plaintiffs choice of forum, which is undoubtedly important to courts.'
While this is a very important consideration, the disruption of plaintiffs
choice of forum could be outweighed by the inherent fairness in allowing
a defendant to utilize the same calculation as a plaintiff in establishing
jurisdiction. 170 This is a valid counterpoint, but practically it seems
difficult to entertain. It is not likely that plaintiffs choice of forum can
generally be outweighed, and a balancing, case-by-case test of some sort
would be difficult to implement and enforce.
Additionally, allowing potential attorney's fees will create a slippery
slope where far more causes of action will be removable. 171 The potential
fees method gives the opportunity for removing defendants to take
advantage of the method by claiming exorbitant potential attorney's
fees. 172 This will then serve to create federal jurisdiction where there
should not be federal jurisdiction. 173 This possible problem is countered
by the fact that defendants have a burden of proof when alleging an
amount of attorney's fees in removal actions. 14 However, the burden
only slightly tempers the issue. A defendant, if alleging attorney's fees to
be calculated into the amount in controversy, is obligated to prove by at
least a preponderance of the evidence that the attorney's fees are an
accurate representation of the potential attorney's fees to be incurred by
the plaintiff.175 Since a preponderance is "more likely than not," this is
166.

If the case is originally filed in federal court that means that the plaintiff chose to be in

federal court, so the figuring of attorney's fees into the amount in controversy does not hurt the

plaintiff such as when the defendant is removing.
167.
168.
169.

See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
See supra note 30.
See WRIGHTET AL., supra note 8, § 3702.1.

170.

Meaning that the plaintiff gets to use potential fees when originally filing, and the

defendant would get that same privilege. See Smith, 236 F.3d at 1305.

171. If defendants can claim that plaintiffs will incur more fees, then amounts in controversy
across the board will increase.
172. Any moderately complex cause of action will likely be able to hoist a sizable potential
fee: the more complex and lengthy the case, the more hours attorneys will bill.
173.

Meaning that there should not be federal jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332

when the amount in controversy is inflated by speculative attorney's fees.
174.

See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, § 3702.1; see also Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II, Inc.,

608 F.3d 744, 752 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing that a preponderance of the evidence is needed for
defendants to prove plaintiff's attorney's fees).
175.

See WRIGHTET AL., supra note 8, § 3702.1.
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1 76
not likely to be a burdensome enough check to avoid the slippery slope.'
Unless a case is a standard one-count breach of contract claim, for
example, it is incredibly hard for defendants to estimate and show proof
of potential attorney's fees, and courts often seem to be sympathetic to
their plight.

IV. How

SHOULD THE SUPREME COURT RULE?

The Supreme Court will have a tough decision ahead of it when the
time comes to resolve this split, and it is incredibly hard to predict what
the Court will do. While research and studies have been done to predict

the Supreme Court's methods when resolving circuit splits, 17 7 these
178

analyses are not always useful and should be relied upon with caution.
In fact, a recent study on the Roberts Court's resolutions of circuit splits
only revealed that the Court sided with the majority side 511 % of the
time. 179 This is not at all definitive, and thus, the weight of authoritywhich some would grasp onto as one of the only clues as to how the Court
will rule-does not particularly sway the Court. Further, Missouri Life's
precedential value is tenuous at best, as will be explained. 80 The Court
could easily, almost without any question, treat it as a non-factor in their
decision. Therefore, it is not this Note's purpose to predict what the
Supreme Court will do-it increasingly seems like a fool's errand.
Instead, this Note will advocate for what the Court should do when faced
with resolving the split.
First, what should the Court do with MissouriLife?' 81 Should the case
be binding precedent on this issue? No, it should not be. There are many
problems with the precedential value of Missouri Life, not the least of
176.

Depending on the cause of action, potential attorney's fees can be incredibly hard to

prove, and courts often seem to defer to defendants' somewhat meager proof See, e.g., Mirras v.
Time Ins. Co., 578 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1352-53 (M.D. Fla. 2008) (holding that defendant met the

preponderance burden by simply giving a $450/hr for 40 hours estimate); Miera v. Dairyland Ins.
Co., 143 F.3d 1337, 1340 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that defendant's burden was met because the
"realities of modem law practice" was enough to hold that plaintiff's fees would reach the

jurisdictional minimum).
177. See, e.g., Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Measuring CircuitSplits: A CautionaryNote, 4 J.L.
361, 362 (2014); Emily Grant et al., The Ideological Divide: Conflict and the Supreme Court's
CertiorariDecision, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 559 (2012); Colter Paulson, CrystalBallsandSupreme
Court Reversal Statistics, SIXTH CIRCUIT APPELLATE BLOG (July 16, 2014), http://www.sixth

circuitappellateblog.com/news-and-analysis/crystal-balts-and-supreme-court-reversal-statistis/

.

178. See Bruhl, supra note 177, at 362.
179. John S. Summers & Michael J. Newman, Towards a Better Measure and
Understandingof U.S. Supreme Court Review of Courts of Appeals Decisions, 80 U.S. L. WK.

393, 396 (2011).
180. See infra text accompanying notes 183-94.
181.

Mo. State Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 290 U.S. 199 (1933).
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which is its age. 182 At first, yes, the Supreme Court case cited by both the
Tenth183 and Third' 8 4 Circuits seems to support that it is potential
attorney's fees that should be considered. 185 However, it is far from clear;

the opinion of Missouri Life has been described as "cryptic" and
"equivocal" as it pertains to potential attorney's fees, and has clearly been
read in differing ways. 186 The opinion is only a few pages long, and is
very ambiguous in its wording. 187 When the Court in Missouri Life
discusses the attorney's fees, it does so without specifying if they are
potential fees or not-all the Court does is say that plaintiff was entitled
to a "reasonable attorney fee."' 188 Unfortunately, the only definitive
precedential value that MissouriLife may have is to support being able to
include attorney's fees into the amount in controversy, which as
189
discussed earlier is clearly well settled by now.
With Missouri Life next to useless for this issue and the weight of
authority clearly not much of a factor in the Court's decision, the Court
has a virtual blank slate on which to make its ruling. This Note suggests
that the Court take the recommendation provided in Part lIJ.C and rule
definitively that only those fees that have already been incurred by the
plaintiff should be calculated into the amount in controversy on
removal. 190
CONCLUSION

There is no time riper than now for the Supreme Court to resolve this
circuit split. In fact, the Court has recently agreed to hear argument and
decided cases concerning removal' 9 ' and attorney's fees, 192 suggesting
that the Court thinks that these are important issues. The interest is there,
and the cases regarding the circuit split are being appealed; Grant v.
Chevron Phillips Chemical Co. from the Fifth Circuit petitioned for
certiorari after the defendant lost due to the time-of-removal method

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Missouri Life was decided in 1933-a decidedly different time. Id.
See Miera v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 143 F.3d 1337, 1340 (10th Cir. 1998).
See Suber v. Chrysler Corp., 104 F.3d 578, 585 (3d Cir. 1997).
See Mo. Life, 290 U.S. at 200-02.
See Raymond v. Lane Constr. Corp., 527 F. Supp. 2d 156, 163 (D. Me. 2007).
Mo. Life, 290 U.S. 199.
Id. at 200-02.
See supra Part I.
See supra Part III.C.
See Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. LLC v. Owens, 135 S.Ct. 547 (2014).
See John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 713 F.3d 1142 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. granted

(Jan. 15, 2016).

THESE AREN'T THE FEES YOU'RE LOOKING FOR: WHYATTORNEY'S FEES

being used.1 93 Grantwas denied certiorari in 2003,194 but it surely put the
circuit split on the Court's radar. The longer the Court waits to resolve
this issue, the messier it gets. Some circuits are already declining to rule
on the issue, 195 probably to wait for a ruling from higher up.
Attorney's fees are a touchy subject and raise much suspicion among
non-lawyers, and sometimes rightfully so. 196 Fee shifting can become a
dangerous slippery slope when brought to certain areas of law, and
removal via diversity jurisdiction is one of them. Attorney's fees'
presence in jurisdictional matters, although now unavoidable,' 9 7 should
be as limited as possible. A plaintiffs choice of forum is one advantage
held sacred by the legal system, and it cannot be jeopardized by lawyers
looking out for their own interests, either consciously or not. In the case
of the circuit split discussed herein, the most limited application of
attorney's fees is the time-of-removal method. When faced with this
issue, as they undoubtedly will be, the Supreme Court should follow the
Seventh Circuit and side with plaintiffs on this one.

193. See Grant v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., 309 F.3d 864, 876 (5th Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 538 U.S. 945 (2003).).
194. Id.
195. See supra Part Il.C.

196.

As in the case of those class actions mentioned in the introduction. See supra text

accompanying notes 1-3; see also Daniel Fisher, Study Shows Consumer Class-Action Lawyers
Earn Millions, Clients Little, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2013/12/11/

with-consumer-class-actions-lawyers-are-mostly-paid-to-do-nothing/.
197. Unavoidable meaning that the law already provides for attorney's fees to be calculated
into the amount in controversy, and that is not going away. See supra Part I.
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